MORAL HAZARD AND THE EURO CRISIS
October 7, 2011 § 3 Comments
The crisis that this week engulfed the Franco-Belgian Dexia Bank revealed how close Europe is to a new banking meltdown, and to an economic crisis that could be as devastating as that of 2008. It also revealed the dirty little secret about the eurozone crisis. Last week, after a lot of political arm-twisting, the Bundestag approved extra funds for an expanded European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) ostensibly for the bailout of Greece. In truth, Germany – and other eurozone nations – are bailing out not Greece but the banks that lent to Greece. They are stumping up money to stop Athens from uncontrollably defaulting, bringing down banks in France, Germany and elsewhere, thereby unleashing a new financial crisis. The proximate cause of the problem may be Greek debt. But the real worry is of a banking collapse in northern Europe.
One of the key criticisms of the EFSF bailout is that it rewards Greece for its mistakes, for breaking the rules of the eurozone project and indeed for the fraud that Athens perpetrated in accounting for its debt. The bailout, many argue, will lead to moral hazard – the rewarding of wrongdoers for the wrong they have done. But not only is the bailout really not of Greece but of the banks that foolishly lent to it, but rule-breaking was once almost the norm in the eurozone. When the single currency was launched in 1999, all nations agreed that a country’s annual deficit should be limited to 3 per cent of GDP and the total accumulated debt to 60 per cent of GDP. Miscreants were supposed to face a heavy fine. Within five years the two biggest economies in the eurozone, Germany and France, had broken the debt rules for three years in a row. Not wishing to slap down the most important countries in the project, Eurocrats quietly ignored the rule breaking. No sanctions were imposed. « Read the rest of this entry »
