THE MORAL DEMANDS OF FREE SPEECH

In Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews there is a discussion of a book by Abigail Levin on The Cost of Free Speech that takes a different view to hate speech than I do:

For the most part, liberals maintain that unless some speech is proven to cause demonstrable harm, the state must refrain from interfering in liberty of expression on pain of violating neutrality – that is, on pain of endorsing one set of views, values, or a conception of the good over others. This gives rise to an embarrassing tension for liberals who acknowledge that social inequalities like racism, sexism, and homophobia are in no small part due to the exercise of expressive liberties. For, how can a resolutely neutral state maintain a commitment to both equality and liberty? Levin’s primary thesis is that liberal egalitarians are mistaken to think that the state ought (and thus can) remain neutral with respect to certain kinds of speech. Indeed, she argues, the liberal egalitarian commitment to treating citizens with equal concern and respect entails that the state ought to use its power qua source of speech actively to combat hate speech and pornography.

For egalitarians, the question of free speech does indeed pose moral issues. It is not possible simply to argue for freedom of expression. As I suggested in my interview with Peter Molnar, those who campaign for free speech from a radical perspective impose upon themselves a moral obligation: